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BOOK REVIEWS
Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, by Alasdair Macintyre. Notre Dame,
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988. Pp. xii, 420. $22.95.
PHILIP L. QUINN, University of Notre Dame.
The bulk of this large book is devoted to telling what is in effect a tale of three
cities. They are classical Athens, papal Rome of the high middle ages, and
Presbyterian Edinburgh of the Scottish Enlightenment. The tale is episodic.
Each of its episodes involves the development of a tradition of moral inquiry
focused on justice and practical reasoning. And the tale as a whole is carefully
constructed with an eye to drawing from it philosophical morals for today.
Aristotle is the hero of the first episode, supported by a cast of characters
that includes Homer, Thucydides, Sophocles and Plato. The plot line turns
on a dispute about how to extend the legacy of Homeric thought on justice.
Aristotle's achievement is portrayed as linking justice and practical rationality within the context of the polis. The polis, according to MacIntyre, is "the
institution whose concern was, not with this or that particular good, but with
human good as such, and not with desert or achievement in respect of particular practices, but with desert and achievement as such" (p. 34). A particular polis must therefore embody principles about how particular goods are
to be ordered into a comprehensive way of life that constitutes the good for
human beings; a polis cannot be neutral with respect to rival conceptions of
the good. Justice, being concerned primarily with desert, is the norm by which
the polis is ordered and lacks application apart from the polis. So neither can
justice be neutral with respect to competing conceptions of the good. And
since practical reasoning involves essentially claims about the good at stake
for the agent in acting or not acting, the polis also fixes the context of
intelligibility for practical rationality.
The hero of the second episode is Aquinas, and the supp0l1ing cast is made
up of such diverse figures as Cicero, St. Paul, Augustine and Pope Gregory VII.
The plot hinges on a conflict between the Augustinian theological tradition and
a revived Aristotelian philosophy. The achievement of Aquinas is depicted as
overcoming the conflict by integrating Aristotelian elements into an Augustinian
framework. MacIntyre takes pains to emphasize the ways in which the resulting
Thomistic synthesis is at odds with deeply cherished beliefs of liberal modernity.
Thus, for example, Aquinas holds that the Pope has legitimate authority over
secular rulers because secular power is subject to spiritual power as the body
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is subject to the soul. He also maintains that a just political order will include
education into the virtues in the interest of the common good. Hence, MacIntyre argues, "the modern liberal conception of government as securing a
minimum order, within which individuals may pursue their own freely chosen
ends, protected by and large from the moral interference of government, is
also incompatible with Aquinas' account of a just order" (p. 201). And he
also insists that the "standard commercial and financial practices of capitalism are as incompatible with Aquinas' conception of justice as are the standard practices of the kind of adversarial system of legal justice in which
lawyers often defend those whom they know to be guilty" (p. 200).
The third episode in MacIntyre's tale has no hero, but David Hume is its
antihero. The supporting cast is composed of assorted Scottish worthies, most
notably James Dalrymple (Viscount Stair) and Francis Hutcheson. The plot
revolves around pressures toward Anglicization of distinctively Scottish institutions of religion, law and education. Hume's achievement is pictured as
an anglicizing subversion. It was anglicizing because Hume articulated philosophically the principles embodied in the thought and practice of the dominant English social order. According to MacIntyre, it was a social order "in
which passions and interests were, or rather were taken to be, organized so
as to provide mutuality in satisfaction and benefit" (p. 214). And Hume's
achievement was subversive because it consistently drew out the implications
of the sentimental moral epistemology in terms of which Hutcheson had tried
to justify the moral beliefs he inherited from Calvinism and scholastic Aristotelianism. The result was to put practical reason at the service of the passions and to focus justice on insuring systematic mutuality and reciprocity in
their satisfaction.
What are we to make of these three narratives? A full answer to this
question would have to be based on a discussion of the details of MacIntyre's
interpretations of Aristotle, Aquinas, Hume and others. But the space available
in a brief review does not permit, and the limits of my own competence do not
make me well suited to conduct, a discussion of this sort. So I shall confine
myself to considering the more general philosophical lessons that MacIntyre
hopes to teach by means of his narratives. They seem to me to be of two kinds.
The first kind of lesson has to do with conceptions of justice and practical
reasoning. On this score, MacIntyre emphasizes three distinct themes. One
is pluralism. Disagreements among traditions of inquiry are not best explained by the hypothesis that they share a single conception of justice or
practical reasoning. Rather different traditions of inquiry embody irreducibly
diverse and often conflicting conceptions of justice and practical reasoning.
Another theme is holism. Within traditions, conceptions of justice and conceptions of practical reasoning are "closely linked" (p. ix). Moreover, this
linkage also extends to conceptions of human psychology or theories of the
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person and, in some cases at least, to other metaphysical or theological doctrines. And the third theme is contextualism. Premodern accounts of justice
and practical reasoning such as those of Aristotle and Hume presuppose social
contexts of fairly specific sorts. Thus, "Aristotle's presupposed social context
is one in which evaluation is primarily in terms of the achievement of the
ends of activity; Hume's is one in which evaluation is primarily in terms of
the satisfaction of consumers" (p. 298). The claim here seems to be that those
accounts would only be, or perhaps were only meant to be, applicable within
or adequate to social contexts of the sorts they presuppose. In my opinion,
MacIntyre's three narratives provide good illustrations of these themes.
The second kind of lesson has to do with the higher-order methodological
question of how the epistemic credentials of competing traditions of inquiry
into questions about justice and practical reasoning are to be evaluated. Here
Macintyre takes a controversial stand on the side of a traditionalist methodology. Early in the book he proclaims: "What the Enlightenment made us for
the most part blind to and what we now need to recover is, so I shall argue,
a conception according to which the standards of rational justification themselves emerge from and are part of a history in which they are vindicated by
the way in which they transcend the limitations of and provide remedies for
the defects of their predecessors within the history of that same tradition" (p.
7). Or, to put things in a nutshell: "To justify is to narrate how the argument
has gone so far" (p. 8). Within this complex methodological claim, two
further themes may be distinguished. One is historicism. Justification proceeds by way of historical narrative. The other is internalism. Standards of
justification are internal to and inseparable from particular intellectual and
social traditions in which they are embodied. It is the historicist theme of
Macintyre's methodology that explains why the bulk of the book is devoted
to three narratives. It is the internalism that explains why critics of
MacIntyre's earlier work, particularly his After Virtue, have charged it with
having relativistic consequences. And it is from this methodological stance
that MacIntyre launches what I take to be the two most important philosophical arguments of the book. One is, as one might expect, a defense against
relativism; the other is, not surprisingly, an assault on modern liberalism. I
shall consider these arguments in turn.
The notion of tradition-bound rationality ingredient in MacIntyre's intemalism
bears more than a superficial resemblance to the idea of paradigm-bound rationality characteristic of the views of Kuhn in philosophy of science. Though
MacIntyre nowhere in the book mentions Kuhn, he makes use of arguments that
are plainly Kuhnian in spirit. Thus, for example, Kuhn and Feyerabend had
argued that observations cannot decide between rival scientific theories because there are no theory-neutral observations. Macintyre endorses a similar
view. Speaking of the rivalry between Hume's claim that reason must be the
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slave of the passions and the claim by Aristotle and Aquinas that reason can
direct the passions, he maintains that examples of human action cannot settle
the issue. This is because "there are no preconceptual or even pretheoretical
data, and this entails that no set of examples of action, no matter how comprehensive, can provide a neutral court of appeal for decision between rival
theories" (p. 333). Since Kuhn's critics had accused his views of having
relativistic implications, it comes as no surprise to discover MacIntyre's
critics making the same accusation. Nor is it surprising to find that there are
analogies between MacIntyre's response and claims made about scientific
research programs by Lakatos.
MacIntyre takes the relativist challenge to amount to the claim that if
standards of rationality are tradition-bound, then "no issue between contending traditions is rationally decidable" (p. 352). His response comes in two
parts. The first is, in effect, an argument for the possibility of a rational
decision in some cases of conflict. Just as a scientific research program may
cease to make progress by its own lights, so also "it may happen to any
tradition-constituted enquiry that by its own standards of progress it ceases
to make progress" (p. 361). When a tradition thus becomes stagnant or sterile,
it enters a period of what MacIntyre calls 'epistemological crisis.' One possible outcome of an epistemological crisis is the defeat of the tradition in
crisis by an alien tradition. Defeat occurs provided the alien tradition can
both construct an explanation, which is cogent and illuminating by the standards of the defeated tradition, of what it was that rendered the defeated
tradition sterile or incoherent and furnish the resources to solve the problems
that were intractable for the defeated tradition.
But, of course, this is only one possibility. There is no guarantee that all
conflicts between traditions can be resolved by defeat. Indeed, in the light of
the historical record, it does not now even seem likely that the conflict
between relatively robust traditions of moral inquiry such as those represented by Aristotle and Kant will at any time in the foreseeable future be
resolved by the defeat of one by the other. As MacIntyre himself is quick to
acknowledge, it is a matter of historical fact that "for very long periods
traditions of very different kinds do indeed seem to coexist without any
ability to bring their conflicts and disagreements to rational resolution: theological, metaphysical, moral, political, and scientific examples are not hard
to find" (p. 366). So it is incumbent on MacIntyre to do more by way of
responding to the relativist challenge.
What he does is try to construct a dilemma for the relativist that will show
it to be impossible for the challenge to have a rational basis. For the person
who would issue the challenge "must during such period of time either be
him or herself an inhabitant of one of the two or more rival traditions, owing
allegiance to its standards of enquiry and employing them in his or her
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reasoning, or be someone outside all of the traditions, him or herself traditionless" (pp. 366-67). In the former case, absent a severe epistemological
crisis in the tradition in question, the person will be committed to its rationality and so precluded from mounting a rational challenge to it. In the latter
case, because by hypothesis rationality is tradition-bound, the person will
lack the wherewithal to mount any rational challenges. So, in neither case is
there a real possibility that the relativist's challenge is itself rational.
But this argument is unsound, for its major premise does not exhaust the
possibilities. The neglected possibility is that the challenge is raised from
within a rational tradition which is, so to speak, no party to the conflict. This
is not just an abstract possibility in a culture like ours that is rich in sharply
differentiated traditions of inquiry. Thus, for example, it is easy to imagine
an inhabitant of the rational tradition of modern natural science mounting a
relativist challenge to all traditions of moral inquiry. In fact, if I am not
mistaken, this is a common occurrence. One way the argument might go is
this. Because theories in natural science are empirically testable, rational
convergence is at least a possibility. Either rival theories will differ in empirical content, in which case it is possible in principle for experiment to
decide between them, or they will be empirically equivalent, in which case
they are not, appearances to the contrary, really rivals at all but alternative
formulations of a single theory. But because moral theories are not empirically testable, rational convergence is not even a possibility. Hence there are
bound to be at least some issues between contending moral traditions that are
rationally undecidable. And so because such arguments can be constructed
within a tradition of one kind to give rational support to relativism with
respect to all the traditions of another kind, Macintyre's attempt to show that
it is impossible for the relativist challenge to have a rational basis fails. Hence
his position remains undefended against this type of local relativism.
Let us tum now to MacIntyre's polemic against liberalism. What he wishes
to challenge is the current "cultural and political hegemony of liberalism" (p.
401). His strategy is to undermine this position of privilege by demoting
liberalism to the status of just another tradition of moral inquiry with its own
distinctive conceptions of justice and practical reasoning. He contends that a
political order in which liberal justice and practical reasoning are embedded
is "not neutral with respect to rival and conflicting theories of the human
good" (p. 345). And he maintains that "the overriding good of liberalism is
no more and no less than the continued sustenance of the liberal social and
political order" (p. 345).
I think both these claims are mistaken. To be sure, there is a liberal tradition
of moral inquiry in whose history Kant and Mill have prominent roles, and
there is a liberal conception of the human good in which such characteristics
as individualism, autonomy and sincerity have an important place. However,
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it is just because liberalism is an individualistic moral doctrine that social
and political concerns cannot be, for liberals, the whole story about the human
good or even of overriding importance in all circumstances.
What is more, as John Rawls has recently shown, it is possible to argue for
a liberal political order without presupposing any general moral conception
and a fortiori without assuming the liberal conception of the human good.
Such an argument begins with the recognition that a workable conception of
political justice for a modern democratic state "must allow for a diversity of
doctrines and the plurality of conflicting, and indeed incommensurable, conceptions of the good affirmed by the members of existing democratic societies.'" Under such conditions of pluralism, a polis state would have to be, to
a significant extent, a police state. And it seems that MacIntyre shares something like this recognition, for he takes it to have been a discovery of Europe's
educated classes during and after the Wars of Religion following the Reformation that "no appeal to any agreed conception of the good for human
beings, either at the level of practice or of theory, was now possible" (p. 209).
So the argument remains neutral with respect to competing conceptions of
the good. It also applies the principle of toleration to philosophy itself; it
remains neutral on controversial questions in philosophical psychology and
does not involve a metaphysical doctrine of the self. Neither Hume's bundle
theory nor Kantian noumena may be presupposed. This is what Rawls is
getting at when he speaks of justice as fairness as a conception that is political, not metaphysical. The only appeal is to overlapping consensus, the hope
that as a matter of fact the various philosophical and religious doctrines likely
to persist in a more or less just constitutional democracy will turn out to have
enough in common to permit a working agreement on fundamental questions
of political justice.
Of course such a consensus will be at best a contingent and rather fragile
thing if it exists at all. But I think there is reason to hope that in the United
States something close to such a consensus can be extended at least to the
constitutional scheme of basic rights and liberties. I am encouraged in this
hope by such things as the work of John Courtney Murray, which argues from
within a Roman Catholic tradition of natural law morality for the legitimacy
of the constitutional separation of church and state. 2 Perhaps those arguments
can serve to remind readers of this journal that Christians who quite properly
dissent from the conception of the good for human beings embodied in secular
liberal moral theory need not on that account consider themselves at odds
with the liberal political culture of constitutional democracy.
So, if I am right, MacIntyre's position remains undefended against local
relativism and is unsuccessful in its assault on political liberalism. I conclude
that Whose Justice? Which Rationality? fails to achieve two of its most
important philosophical objectives. But I must confess that I found
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MacIntyre's liberal-bashing provocative. Thus I recommend the book both
for its rich historical narrative, which is interesting quite apart from the
philosophical lessons MacIntyre tries to extract from it, and as a useful
antidote to liberal complacency, which lingers in academic circles despite the
fact that liberalism has fallen on hard times in the political arena.

NOTES
1. John Rawls, "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical," Philosophy & Public
Affairs, Vol. 14, No.3 (Summer 1985), p. 225.
2. John Courtney Murray, S.J., We Hold These Truths: Catholic Reflections on the
American Proposition (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1964).

Thomistic Papers IV, edited by Leonard A. Kennedy. Houston: Center for
Thomistic Studies, 1988.207 pp. $23.95 Cloth; $12.95 Paper.
MICHAEL L PETERSON, Asbury College.
This book is mandatory reading for those interested in the contemporary
discussion of the epistemology of religion. Leonard Kennedy, editor of the
previous two volumes in the Thomistic Papers series, has assembled a group
of very capable Thomist scholars dedicated to the defense of Thomistic natural theology, which is criticized in Faith and Rationality (Plantinga and
Wolterstorff, eds. 1983). In this spirited fourth volume of Thomistic Papers,
"Thomistic epistemologists" Henry Veatch, Henri DuLac, Thomas Sullivan,
Dennis McInerny, Richard Connell, Joseph Boyle, and Thomas Russman
sally forth against the "Reformed Epistemologists" in Faith and Rationality.
Most chapters in Thomistic Papers IV target the chapters in Faith and Rationality by Plantinga and Wolterstorff; one chapter scrutinizes Alston's work;
a small part of one chapter comments briefly on one of Mavrodes' stories
and a part on Marsden's work. This review discusses all of the chapters in
the book, but gives slightly greater emphasis to those by Veatch, McInerny,
and Boyle.
Henry Veatch sets the stage for discussion by devoting most of his lengthy
chapter to the analysis of Plantinga's piece "Reason and Belief in God."
Veatch affirms at the outset the essential agreement between Thomistic and
Reformed thinkers: that one chief aim of Christian philosophy is the exhibition of the rationality of the Christian faith. The great differences lie in how
the two groups of scholars conceive of this project.

